Portuguese Emigration After World War II
(essay)
The northern Portuguese landscape is dotted with old houses that are architecturally exotic, with plenty of small, picturesque towers and innumerable decorative elements. One also finds new houses, architecturally reminiscent of northern European cottages, with black roofs and large windows. Then there are expensive suburban houses, which their owners have covered with colorful tiles. A significant number of these are currently being built or enlarged.
These are the houses of former or present-day emigrants. The older ones are known as Brazilian houses and the more recent as French houses. Seemingly out of context, they dot the traditional landscape and constitute the most obvious material evidence that emigration has been a constant feature of modern Portuguese life.
Although Portuguese migrated to the United States, Venezuela, Germany, and Luxembourg (to name just a few of the countries where sizable Portuguese immigrant communities have settled historically), the labeling of these houses is rooted in the country’s migratory experience. Up to the 1950s, Brazil received more than 80 percent of Portuguese migratory flows, and France approximately half from that period on.
The objective of this chapter is to present a general overview of the Portuguese migratory experience from World War II to the 1980s. It is, however, important to emphasize that Portuguese migration has been a significant historical process for centuries, one that has changed not only the country’s landscape but also its way of life and its people’s mentality.
The analysis presented here is based on the assumption that Portuguese emigration is essentially an international labor flow, which has changed according to the demand for labor in the international market of the macro geographical system to which the country belongs. Its evolution has depended not only on the potential migrants’ assessment of available rewards for labor abroad, but also on the political sanctioning of the “recipient” nations and the strength of the migrant network active at both ends of the trajectory.
Migration Policies: The Legal Framework
The Marshall Plan gave Western Europe the means with which to launch its postwar economic recovery. [1] Southern Europe and other peripheral regions covered the initial labor shortages resulting from war casualties, and later substituted native labor in the so-called dirty and low-paid jobs. Thus, between 1958 and 1973, the six countries of the European Economic Community issued eight million first work permits to facilitate a mass transfer of labor from the peripheral south to the industrialized north of Europe.
It was only from the 1960s on that Portugal began to participate substantially in this intra-European transfer of labor. This can be shown with an analysis of foreign arrivals in France between 1950 and 1974. France was a major destination for migration in this period and the preferred destination for Portuguese emigrants. Between 1950 and 1959, Italians represented more than half of the total foreign inflow. In 1960, Spaniards equaled the number of Italians entering France, with each of these nationalities contributing 30,000 migrants to a total of 72,600 arrivals. The Spaniards replaced the Italians as France’s main suppliers of foreign labor from 1961 to 1965, and were in turn replaced by the Portuguese from 1966 to 1972. From 1962 on, Portugal’s share grew constantly. In 1970 and 1971, Portuguese migration peaked. In an overall total of 255,000 arrivals in 1970 and 218,000 in 1971, the Portuguese contribution represented 53 percent (136,000) and 51 percent (111,000 migrants) respectively. [2]
The Portuguese did not simply replace the Italians and the Spaniards numerically; they also took up jobs left vacant by them in public works, construction, and the domestic and personal service sectors, as well as in agriculture. [3] An analysis of the structure of the active native and foreign labor force in France also suggests that the labor market was segmented, with certain jobs specifically taken up by foreign laborers in the public works and construction sectors. [4]
The oil crisis of 1973-74 and the restrictive immigration policies of receiving countries halted the influx of foreigners. Up to then, however, the major recipient European countries had “open door” immigration policies. The same cannot be said of Portuguese migratory policy. Indeed, until 1974, individual freedom to emigrate was subordinated to the economic and imperial aims of the state. According to Article 31 of the 1933 Constitution, “The state has the right and the obligation to coordinate and regulate the economic and social life of the Nation with the objective of populating the national territories, protecting emigrants, and disciplining emigration.” The Estado Novo tried to attain three key goals with this policy: to meet the country’s own labor needs, to satisfy its interests in Africa, and to benefit from emigrant remittances with a supervised export of labor.
In order to insure the attainment of these goals the Estado Novo enacted several policy measures concerning emigration. Thus, in 1944 the issuing of ordinary passports to any industrial worker or rural labor was interdicted; in 1947, after a temporary total ban on emigration, a special government agency, simultaneously dependent on the Foreign and the Interior ministries, was created to regulate and supervise emigration. The Junta da Emigração aimed to implement a quota system that defined the maximum number of departures by region and occupation, after taking into account regional labor needs and the structure of the active population.
According to the same logic, several bilateral treaties were signed in the 1960s with the Netherlands, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. These treaties, which explicitly aimed to maximize economic returns from emigration to these countries, were accompanied by an order to the Emigration Services to allow a maximum of thirty thousand legal departures a year, and by a total ban on the legal departure of those engaged in specific occupations. [5] The combined effect of these policies was to ensure a migratory flow that the state considered beneficial to the country’s labor supply and to its economic development.
The rationale behind this last set of governmental policies has to be linked to the new economic model of development endorsed by the Estado Novo during the 60’s. In fact, while the previous model of economic development favored the labor-intensive traditional industries in northern Portugal and rural development, the new model favored the creation of a leading modern industrial sector in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. It was thought that this new industrial sector in conjunction with emigration would absorb the rural surplus. It was also thought that this industrial sector, along with the banking and insurance sectors also centered mainly in the Lisbon area, would absorb the majority of skilled or highly skilled workers and professionals. In fact, neither of these groups was particularly inclined toward emigration.
On the eve of the 1974 Revolution, the state was ready to promulgate an unprecedented liberal law, justified on the grounds that emigration was highly beneficial for Portugal because it promoted gains in productivity and the rationalization of production methods. The law concluded with the following statement: “Emigration, which acts as a positive factor in modernization and the rationalization of labor, contributed greatly to the progress and development of the country.” [6] Individual freedom to emigrate and return were finally written into the 1976 Constitution. By that time, however, most European countries had shifted to a “closed-door” policy.
Between 1950 and 1988, the Portuguese Emigration Bureau, the Secretaria de Estado de Emigração, registered 1,375,000 legal departures. [7] Of these, five countries absorbed 82 percent (see Table 10.1). This official picture should be compared with French and German sources, which state that the number of Portuguese migrants entering these two countries, during this period, was 1,259,000 immigrants. [8] Even revising Portuguese emigration figures taking into account only these two destinations, emigration between 1950 and 1988 totaled at least 2,152,000. This means that during this period, at least 36 percent of Portuguese migrants left the country illegally. [9]
No systematic study has ever been made of clandestine migrants. The study of illegal Portuguese migration in other historical periods, as well as available information on illegal departures to Europe after World War II, however, indicates that clandestine flows differ significantly from legal ones. Illegal Portuguese migrants tend to be isolated and unskilled males in their prime; this increases the likelihood that legal flows do not accurately reflect actual migratory flows between 1950 and 1988. [10]
One corrective for the discrepancies in the official figures is to examine the relative attraction of the principal recipient countries. According to French and German records, we can correct the distribution in Table 10.2. Table 10.1 (Legal Departures)) shows that the two preferred European destinations (France and Germany) attracted 35 percent of the total between 1950 and 1988, and that the three overseas destinations (Brazil, Canada, and the United States) attracted 47 percent. Table 10.2 (Legal and Illegal Departures), by contrast, indicates that the two key European destinations accounted for 59 percent of the total, and the three overseas destinations for just 30 percent, in the same period.
TABLE 10.1 Principal Destinations of Portuguese Legal Emigration, 1950-1988 (in thousands)
| Legal Departures | Percentage | |
| France | 347 | 25.0 |
| Brazil | 321 | 23.0 |
| United States | 193 | 14.0 |
| Germany | 135 | 10.0 |
| Canada | 138 | 10.0 |
| Other | 241 | 18.0 |
| TOTAL | 1,375 | 100.0 |
| Legal and Illegal Departures | Percentage | |
| France | 1,024 | 48.0 |
| Brazil | 321 | 15.0 |
| United States | 193 | 9.0 |
| Germany | 235 | 11.0 |
| Canada | 138 | 6.0 |
| Other | 241 | 11.0 |
| TOTAL | 2,152 | 100.0 |
We can also correct the yearly totals by destination (see Table 10.6), which helps to obtain a better sense of the evolution of the “true” Portuguese migratory flow. The first remarkable change indicated in Table 10.6 is the intensity of growth of the total migratory flow. The annual average number of departures jumped from 33,000 in 1955-59 to 55,000 in 1960-64, 110,000 in 1965-69, and 134,000 in 1970-74. The average declined drastically to 37,000 in 1975-79, the same level of average annual departures attained in the initial period (1950-54). Numbers decreased even further to 17,000 average departures between 1980 and 1988. This intense and sustained growth in the 1960s and early 1970s can be attributed to the Portuguese migratory flow to Europe, particularly to France, which absorbed 60 percent of the total migratory flow in this period.
| Figura 1 – Não digitalizada.São precisos os dados para construir o gráfico. |
The data from Table 10.6 can be visually summarized in Figure 10.1. Both Table 10.6 and Figure 10.1 show that Portuguese emigration grew constantly and substantially from 1950, when departures numbered 22,000, to 1970, when departures numbered 183,000. It declined from 1971 to 1988, as departures dropped from 158,000 to 13,000. The peak years of Portuguese emigration after World War II occurred between 1965 and 1974, when the annual average number of departures reached 122,000.
It can also be inferred that three major changes in preferred destinations took place between 1950 and 1979. In the first decade (1950-59), the overseas flow was clearly dominant. Indeed, of the 350,000 departures, 327,000 (93 percent) went overseas. A single country, Brazil, absorbed 68 percent of the global total of departures. In the following decade (1960-69), the overseas flow lost its relevance. Europe attracted 68 percent of the total number of departures, with France absorbing 59 percent of the global total. This shift occurred in 1962-63. In 1962, total departures numbered 43,000, of which 24,000 went overseas (57 percent) and 19,000 went to Europe (43 percent). In 1963, the total number of departures numbered 55,000, of which 22,000 (41 percent) went overseas and 33,000 (59 percent) to Europe. Europe clearly dominated between 1963 and 1977, but from then on, overseas destinations became dominant again. The European share fell from 56 percent in 1977 to 43 percent in 1978 and 39 percent in 1979. In the last period, 1980-88, overseas destinations accounted for 51 percent of all departures.
The change in the relative weight of migratory flows overseas is not the only noticeable shift. Although they tended to decrease in absolute terms, overseas flows did not register any dramatic change before 1979. They did, however, register a major change in the absolute and relative weight of the receiving countries. In the early 1960s, the contraction of the flow to Brazil was quite dramatic: the average annual number of departures to that country fell from twelve thousand to three thousand between 1960-64 and 1965-69. The United States and Canada took Brazil’s place during this period; the annual number of departures to the United States rose from three thousand in 1960-64 to ten thousand in 1965-69, and to Canada the total rose from four thousand to six thousand.
It is thought that lack of information on illegal migrants creates a bias in the relative weight of each sex, in the distribution by age group, and in the distribution by marital status. Origin and distribution by economic activity are meant to be the characteristics least affected, if not in absolute at least in relative terms. This analysis will therefore focus on the more reliable factors. Table IO.3 shows the distribution of Portuguese emigration by region of origin.
Because the contributions of the islands and the mainland are quite different in terms of their respective shares in total flows, their direction, and the characteristics of their migrants, they will be treated separately. Between 1950 and 1988, the islands’ migratory flow accounted for 21 percent of the total, and was overwhelmingly directed overseas. The Azorean flow went to the United States and grew markedly during the 1960s and the 1970s, particularly after the United States passed the 1965 amendments favoring family reunification in the concession of U.S. immigrant visas and revised its national origin quota system, in place since 1968. These measures increased the share of southern European migration and the Portuguese quota of entry with it. [11] Madeira’s flow contracted markedly after the 1950s, when Brazil ceased to be a major destination, and has remained at a relatively low level since.
TABLE 10.3 Percentage of Portuguese Emigration by District, 1950-1988
| 1950-59 | 1960-69 | 1970-79 | 1950-79 | 1980-88 | |
| Aveiro | 10.74 | 6.62 | 7.32 | 7.84 | 10.93 |
| Beja | 0.18 | 1.08 | 2.04 | 1.13 | 0.45 |
| Braga | 6.04 | 9.31 | 6.24 | 7.63 | 4.01 |
| Bragança | 6.32 | 3.78 | 1.81 | 3.85 | 1.06 |
| C. Branco | 1.43 | 5.17 | 1.94 | 3.33 | 1.15 |
| Coimbra | 4.80 | 2.84 | 3.78 | 3.59 | 3.65 |
| Évora | 0.10 | 0.38 | 0.73 | 0.41 | 0.24 |
| Faro | 2.25 | 3.69 | 2.45 | 2.98 | 1.28 |
| Guarda | 6.76 | 5.80 | 2.29 | 5.04 | 2.22 |
| Leiria | 3.98 | 7.66 | 6.88 | 6.53 | 4.95 |
| Lisbon | 2.17 | 8.10 | 12.14 | 7.78 | 18.91 |
| Portalegre | 0.15 | 0.37 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.20 |
| Porto | 10.47 | 8.55 | 7.73 | 8.79 | 7.76 |
| Santarém | 1.94 | 3.79 | 3.42 | 3.23 | 3.50 |
| Setúbal | 0.32 | 1.75 | 3.08 | 1.77 | 5.19 |
| V. do Castelo | 4.64 | 5.63 | 2.97 | 4.63 | 3.52 |
| Vila Real | 5.54 | 3.88 | 3.98 | 4.32 | 4.21 |
| Viseu | 10.59 | 4.73 | 5.39 | 6.37 | 3.26 |
| Total mainland | 78.41 | 83.12 | 74.51 | 79.51 | 76.50 |
| Azores | 6.14 | 11.17 | 19.30 | 12.23 | 21.21 |
| Madeira | 13.75 | 5.63 | 6.17 | 7.80 | 2.29 |
| Unknown | 1.70 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.46 | 0.00 |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| Total number of emigrants | 342,928 | 646,962 | 392,517 | 1,382,407 | 89,562 |
The flow from the mainland in the period 1950-88 represented 79 percent of the global flow. It was essentially directed toward Europe, particularly to France and Germany. It is possible to conclude from Table 10.3 that three regions of the mainland – the Lisbon interior, the Alentejo, and the Algarve – were poor sources of emigration. Together these three regions supplied only a total of 111,000 migrants between 1950 and 1988. This figure is lower than the total of any of the other five regions considered individually. The heaviest suppliers of the period were the coastal regions, always contributing more than half the total migrants. The northern coast alone provided 305,000 migrants (26 percent of all the mainland flow).