Monetary policy cannot be used to solve structural problems, such as the unacceptably high level of unemployment in the euro area. Structural problems call for structural solutions, in this case measures targeted at making labour and product markets work more flexibly. The best contribution the ECB's monetary policy can make in this context is to maintain price stability. In this way one of the conditions for sustainable growth in incomes and employment is created. As important as this is, it should be realised that jobs are created by firms which are confident about the future and not by central banks.
5. Accountability and transparency
Accountability for policies is the logical complement to independence in a democratic society. The Maastricht Treaty includes a number of provisions in this respect. First, there is the mandate to pursue price stability. This provides a qualitative measure against which the ECB's performance can be measured. As I have already mentioned, we have decided to enhance this by providing a quantitative definition of price stability. One of the aims of publishing our monetary policy strategy is to make our policy decisions transparent.
The ECB has to publish an annual report in which, inter alia, the monetary policy of the previous and current year are discussed. I present this Annual Report to the EU Council and to the European Parliament, which may hold a general debate on the basis of it. The President and other members of the Executive Board of the ECB may be heard by the competent committees of the European Parliament. I have agreed to appear before the European Parliament at least four times a year. The ECB has to report on its activities at least quarterly. It has been decided to go beyond this requirement and to publish a monthly bulletin.
It is my view that the main way to achieve accountability is through being transparent and open. In passing, I should like to note that transparency also enhances the effectiveness of a central bank. The better it is understood, the more successful a central bank is. Apart from the activities I have already mentioned, transparency is achieved in several ways. Every month, after the first meeting of the Governing Council, the Vice-President and I give a press conference. I start the conference with a comprehensive introductory statement, in which I explain the decisions taken by the Governing Council and the underlying analysis and arguments for and against. This introductory statement is published immediately on the ECB's Internet Web site. This is followed by a question and answer session attended by several hundred journalists. The questions and answers are also published on the Internet shortly afterwards. All the members of the Governing Council frequently make speeches, give interviews and contribute to journals and books. Thousands of people visit the ECB and the national central banks each year and, for our part, we and our staff attend many conferences and other public events.
6. EU enlargement
The European integration process continues. The euro should be made a success. I have already explained how we have started the process of doing that. Some observers have criticised the EU for its "obsession with its own internal dynamics", in particular in the context of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). With all energies focused on meeting the convergence criteria and the preparation for the launch of the euro, Europeans outside the EU have wondered whether EMU and enlargement are not mutually exclusive objectives.
Let me briefly comment on this issue. After the historic decision to complete the European Single Market in the 1980s, it was felt that economic integration should not stop at that point. To fully reap the rewards of economic integration within the Community, a single currency was felt necessary; a logic pointedly encapsulated in the title of one report: "One market, one money".
Hence, the underlying idea of EMU was to advance European integration and to ensure that full use would be made of the economic potential of the Single Market. This idea continues to be the focus of European policy-makers, as evidenced by the association agreements and the ongoing accession negotiations with a number of European countries, Poland among them. Good and mutually beneficial economic relations with third countries in Europe and further afield are a pillar of EU policy orientation. Recognising this, the principles of an open market economy with free competition are enshrined in the Treaty on European Union. EMU will not weaken this commitment, but rather reinforce it. Closer co-operation in Europe and the respect of common principles in the political, economic and social fields are likely to form the basis for further integration. The ECB shall contribute to this process within the scope of its responsibility.
Countries wishing to deepen their monetary co-operation to the ultimate extent possible by forming a monetary union will have to adapt their economic and legal systems to the standards required by the Treaty and aim at a sufficient degree of economic convergence. In the absence of these conditions, adjustment costs for both current and new participants could be high. Any premature decision on the adoption of the euro could have severe repercussions on a country's competitiveness and trigger painful economic adjustments. Therefore, implementation of the necessary institutional reforms and of a sufficient degree of convergence should not be considered as an obstacle preventing further integration in Europe, but rather as an essential means of ensuring the lasting success of EMU, for existing and new participants alike. Looking at the impressive progress made in a relatively short time in this country, there is no reason to be pessimistic about Poland's chances of meeting these standards and convergence criteria. I shall not venture, however, to predict when this will be the case.
Even at the current juncture, though, EMU in one part of Europe is already having an impact on the whole region. Let me briefly mention two aspects:
* If the euro emerges, as I believe it will, as a strong and
stable currency, it will provide the countries in the region
with an important reference currency, an anchor towards
which, should the intention arise, monetary policy could
credibly be oriented.
* Furthermore, EMU is set to bring about the development of a
truly unified European financial market, close to that of
the United States in depth and sophistication. The
competitive pressures of this euro area financial market
will create more favourable financing conditions for
borrowers. A number of central and eastern European
countries have already successfully tapped this market.
In view of these effects, it is altogether natural that the ECB has started to follow with great interest economic and financial developments in the wider Europe, particularly in those countries which have applied for EU membership. Moreover, the ECB monitors closely the exchange rate developments with those countries which have established some form of exchange rate link to the euro.
The euro has the potential to become more than just a new currency for almost 300 million people in 11 countries. It may also become a unifying symbol, standing for all that the peoples of Europe have in common. Consequently, the public perception of the euro could endow the single currency with a role in the European integration process reaching beyond monetary policy in the strict sense. May the euro contribute to the establishment of what the preamble to the Treaty Establishing the European Community calls: "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe".
***
The single European monetary policy
Speech by Willem F. Duisenberg
President of the European Central Bank
at the University of Hohenheim
on 9 February 1999, in Hohenheim, Germany
Ladies and gentlemen, The single European monetary policy has been a reality for a little more than five weeks. After years of intensive preparatory work and successful economic convergence, monetary policy is now jointly determined for a large part of Europe by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. The monetary policy is implemented by the Eurosystem, the name given to the ECB and the 11 central banks of the EU Member States participating in Monetary Union.
The single currency is quoted on the international financial markets and is used in non-cash payments. However, the euro will not appear as yet in tangible form as banknotes and coins. Nonetheless there is no doubt that this currency, which was only brought into existence on 1 January 1999, will play an important role both within the euro area and beyond.
There is good reason for this confidence, ladies and gentlemen. Overall the first few weeks went smoothly for the single currency and the monetary policy of the Eurosystem. The start did not pass by entirely without a hitch - which was not to be expected in any case, given the significance and scale of this project - but there were no major complications.
Monetary Union is a unique and outstanding achievement. It provides the great opportunity to achieve the goal of lasting price stability throughout Europe. Price stability is the best contribution that monetary policy can make to lasting economic and employment growth in Europe. The national governments and all those involved in collective wage bargaining are being called on to remove the structural causes of the excessively high unemployment. We can only hope that the introduction of the euro will spur the implementation of structural reforms.
The stability-oriented monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem
The Treaty establishing the European Community assigns the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) - and thereby the Eurosystem - the primary objective of maintaining price stability. The Governing Council will do its utmost to fulfil this task and to explain its monetary policy so as to be comprehensible to the general public. For this reason we have developed a stability-oriented monetary policy which essentially consists of three main elements.
The Governing Council has published a quantitative definition of its primary objective, price stability. This gives clear guidance for expectations in relation to future price developments. Price stability is defined as an increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices of the euro area of less than 2% compared with the previous year. The publication of this definition provides the public and the European Parliament with a clear benchmark against which to measure the success of the single monetary policy, and thereby provides for the transparency and accountability of the Eurosystem and its policy.
The wording "less than 2%" clearly defines the upper limit for the measured inflation rate which is compatible with price stability. I do not think I need emphasise that deflation - or a sustained fall in prices - would be incompatible with price stability. The latest available data for the annual rate of inflation according to the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the euro area as a whole fall within the definition of price stability. This outcome is clearly the result, above all, of the successful monetary policy of the national central banks in the years before the start of Monetary Union.
The ECB has only been responsible for monetary policy for a little more than one month. It will only be possible to judge the success of its current policy in one to two years'time. This reflects the fact that the transmission of monetary policy impulses is subject to relatively long and variable time lags. The Governing Council has therefore emphasised that price stability must be maintained in the medium term. This statement underlines not only the need for a forward-looking approach to monetary policy, but also takes into consideration the short-term volatility of prices in response to non-monetary shocks which are beyond the control of monetary policy.
In order to achieve the goal of price stability, our strategy rests, in particular, on two "pillars". Before I explain this in more detail, I should like to emphasise that traditional and previously established macroeconomic relationships could change as a consequence of the introduction of the euro. This was one key reason why neither a monetary targeting nor a direct inflation targeting strategy could be applied. Our strategy is also more than just a simple combination of these two approaches. Rather, it is precisely tailored to the needs of the ECB.
The first pillar of the monetary policy strategy is a prominent role for money. Since inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon in the medium term, the money supply provides a natural "nominal anchor" for a monetary policy geared to safe-guarding price stability. To emphasise this prominent role, the Governing Council has published a quantitative reference value for growth in the money supply. The first reference value decided upon by the Governing Council for growth in M3 was 4.5% per annum and was published on 1 December. This value is based on the above-mentioned definition of price stability and assumes a trend growth in real gross domestic product of 2-2.5% per annum, as well as a medium-term reduction in the velocity of circulation of M3 of around 0.5-1% per annum.
We shall not, however, respond mechanistically to deviations from the reference value for money supply growth, but shall first analyse them carefully for signals relating to future price developments. Larger or sustained deviations normally signal risks to price stability.
The second pillar of the monetary policy strategy consists in a broadly based assessment of the outlook for price developments in the entire euro area. This assessment will be based on a broad range of monetary policy indicators. In particular, those variables which could contain information on future price developments will be analysed in depth. This analysis should not only provide information on the risks for price development, but should also help to identify the causes of unexpected changes in important economic variables.
Some commentators reduced this comprehensive analysis to an inflation forecast. At the same time, there were demands for the ECB to have to publish these forecasts in order to satisfy the need for transparency and accountability. Therefore allow me to make this clear: our strategy includes a comprehensive analysis of numerous indicators and several forecasts. To focus on a single official inflation forecast of the Eurosystem for a specific point in time would in no way accurately reflect our internal analytical and decision-making process. It would impinge upon the transparency and clarity of the explanation of our policy. The publication of an official inflation forecast would also be inappropriate with regard to the accountability of the ECB, all the more so if this forecast were based on the assumption of no change in the monetary policy. The success of the monetary policy of the ECB should primarily be measured in terms of the maintenance of price stability, not the accuracy of its conditional forecasts.
The stability-oriented monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem, which I have just outlined, constitutes a new and clear strategy. It emphasises the primacy of the goal of price stability. It takes into account the inevitable uncertainties concerning economic relationships inherent in the transition to Monetary Union and the associated systemic changes and guarantees a high degree of transparency.
Ladies and gentlemen, allow me to comment on certain suggestions on the orientation of monetary policy which have recently appeared in the press. Some of these ideas give the impression that monetary policy should concentrate upon objectives other than price stability, since stable prices have already been achieved. Inter alia, it has been suggested that the ECB should react more or less mechanistically to exchange rate developments or other variables such as, for instance, unit labour costs. Furthermore, there were calls for monetary policy, by means of reductions in interest rates, to be used to combat unemployment. Against this background there is a need to set out clearly the possibilities and limitations of monetary policy.
Both the reasoning in the Maastricht Treaty and many economic analyses show that the best contribution the single monetary policy can make to employment growth is to concentrate on price stability. Without such a clear approach there is a danger that the public may question the commitment of the Eurosystem to the goal of maintaining price stability. Inflation expectations, risk premia and thus long-term rates would rise. This would increase the cost of the investment which is necessary for a sustained and lasting rise in the standard of living.
Even under the best possible circumstances, though - i.e. if it proves to be possible to assure lasting price stability - monetary policy alone cannot solve the major economic problems of unemployment and future problems in social security systems.