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Japanese Imperial Navy Essay Research Paper The (стр. 2 из 2)

fight a war over an extended amount of time. Japan did not have the ability to

absorb loses over such an amount of time, and failed to realize that with the

size of the United States? economy, they would be able to quickly buy more

materials and replace ships faster then the Japanese. Japans shipyards were not

large enough to handle such a big demand to accommodate a war.

More faults can be found in the initial design, production, and use of its

aircraft and submarines. Their aircraft industry was able to mass-produce planes

but was unable to adopt new and better plane designs as the war continued and

therefore their aircraft quickly became outdated. Another fault with the planes

was that the fuel tanks were not protected enough. The Allies had developed self

sealing tanks, therefore, no matter how good the Japanese were, the Allies could

take a much bigger beating and survive then they themselves could. The Japanese

submarines lacked a lot of new technology, their hulls were vulnerable to sonar,

they had slow diving times do to their large size, were pour at maneuvering when

submerged, and when surfaced, their large conning towers could be picked up on

radar. Last, the Japanese had kept all of their units on the frontline longer

then the Allies, who brought back home its pilots to train more after a certain

amount of time while the more experienced Japanese units died out.

While they did do well towards the beginning of the war, some mistakes were

made in a few key battles. In Midway, a Japanese fleet of four carriers

preparing for an attack when they were stumbled upon by three carriers belonging

to the United States. If the Japanese had the six ships that were planned to be

there, one could bet that because of the unfair advantage they would have had,

they would have won the battle. But because the choice was made earlier to leave

two carriers behind at the Coral Sea, 3 vs. 4 was doable by the United States.

Also, the Japanese needed to add a few more Anti-Aircraft weapons on their

ships, the little they did have proved non-effective against the number of

planes the United States sent out.

The break that occurred between the Solomon Island Campaign and the Battle of

the Philippine Sea was a big mistake made by the Japanese. It allowed for a the

United States to play catch-up on their ships while Japanese ships sat broken in

shipyards that had become full in the beginning of the war. At the Battle of

Leyte Gulf, the Japanese had hoped to attack the shore. To do this the needed to

lure a fleet of ships guarding it away and they chose to do so with their

carriers. As they did this, cruisers would head for shore. Well, it might have

worked if the United States didn?t leave behind a few guard ships that

stumbled upon the advancing cruisers. This was the start of the greatest naval

battle in history in which Japan would lose and start on its way losing the war

against the United States.

??By failing to recognize that attacking the U.S. meant not just fighting

a single decisive battle, but waging total war, Japan doomed itself to a

conflict it could not win in the long term.?

Jon Parshall

Bibliography

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Greene, Jack. War at Sea. New York: Gallery Books, 1988.

Parshall, Jon. Home Page. December 19, 1999 <http://www.skypoint.com/

members/jbp/economic.htm>.

Parshall, Jon. ?The Japanese Imperial Navy in World War II.? Interview.

December 19-20, 1999.

Steinberg, Rafael. Return to the Philippines. Ed. Of Time Life Magazine.

Alexandria, Virginia: Time Life Books, 1979.

The Complete Reference Collection. Computer software. The Learning Company,

1997. IBM, PC-Windows 98.

Wheeler, Keith. The Road to Tokyo. Ed. Of Time Life Magazine. Alexandria,

Virginia: Time Life Books, 1979.

Van der Vat, Dan. The Pacific Campaign. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.

Zich, Arthur. The Rising Sun. Ed. Of Time Life Magazine. Alexandria,

Virginia: Time Life Books, 1977.