time that Croatia declared it?s independence, however, Serbs had lived
in those regions for generations and came to think of it as their
homeland. The Croats, however, failed to recognize the Serbs and give
them citizenship in the new Croatian state.
Serbs on Croatia had considered themselves equal to Croats
living next door yet it appeared that every chance Franjo Tudjman got,
he took the opportunity to elevate the Croat while lowing the status
of the Serb. The Croat flag was altered so that the checkerboard, a
long time symbol of Croats and, unfortunately, of the Ustasha, was
emblazoned onto the flag. Serb travel had been restricted, Serb
participation in government was becoming limited and the military
began taking strategic positions with Serb majority areas (Glenny,
93). Clearly, with so many tanks, guns, and soldiers, the stage was
set for armed conflict.
The armed conflict in these Serb pockets of population came to
a head in Knin, where Croats were a minority while Serbs maintained a
majority. Milosevic saw these Serbs as an opportunity to, if not
save Yugoslavia as it was, then to at least expand what remained of
Yugoslavia as much as possible. Milosevic, with the help of Jovan
Raskovic, began to stir trouble in the city of Knin. They reminded
the Serbs living in Croatia of the atrocities that the Ustasha
inflicted upon the Serbs who had lived there during the Second World
War and that the same thing was happening again to the Serbs at the
hands of Croat fascists. Serb media told tales of the new nationalist
regime in Croatia coming to wipe out anything not Croat.
The Serbs in Croatia reacted to their treatment by holding a
referendum which was declared null and void by Tudjman. However, Serb
areas voted to leave Croatia. Theoretically, the Croats should have
been able to quell the rebellion. This was not the case because when
the Croatian police sent three helicopters to the area to take control
and stop the protests, they were met with two MiG aircraft from the
JNA and threatened to be shot down if they failed to turn around.
Obviously, at this point, the situation is getting tenuous
enough for the international community to take an interest in what is
going on. Two, armed aircraft from the Yugoslav Army confronted three
helicopters from Croatia. By this time, the international community
had recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia upon the lead
from Germany but they were still allowing the remainder of Yugoslavia,
essentially the Serbs, to engage in warfare with Croatia.
So, why didn?t the United States intervene at this point?
Several answers are viable. The first and foremost reason for a lack
of intervention has to do with our newly emerging relationship with
Russia. Russians had been closely aligned with Serbs during World War
II and this relationship continues onward even until today. Telling
the Serbs that the United States was going to enter Yugoslavia and
stop the violence was to say that the United States was going to go
into Yugoslavia and crush the Serbs, who controlled the government and
the JNA. We were trying desperately to form close, personal ties with
Russia to support their efforts toward a market economy and democracy
to prevent the Russian government and their nuclear weapons to fall
into the wrong hands. To offend the Serbs, and thus the Russians,
would have been political suicide.
Second, what exactly did Yugoslavia mean to the United States.
As stated above, with the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Cold War
was over. We no longer needed to nurture ties between Eastern
European states in order to head off the spread of Communism.
Yugoslavia didn?t have an impressive economy where American business
interested could invest and reap massive dividends. Much like most of
the Eastern and especially Southeastern European nations, the economy
was lackluster and uninviting to foreign investment.
The third reason that the United States chose not to interfere
and perhaps the most important is that intervening would imply a long
term commitment of men, equipment, and supplies. The recent Gulf War
had devoured many of the resources that would have been needed to
complete an operation in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the terrain of the
area was as inhospitable as Viet Nam?s was in the 1960?s and 1970?s.
Engaging the military in an operation in Yugoslavia would offer the
same challenges that Viet Nam offered. There was no popular support
for either side of the conflict in the United States. What monetary
or economic gain could be made by intervention? Finally, who really
cared? I know that last one seems particularly cruel but if we
examine the conflict, the people of Yugoslavia and those people alone
seemed to be the only ones feeling the effects of the battles. The
fighting was primarily in Croatia… not in Greece… not in
Hungary… and not in Italy. Perhaps the e!
xecutive branch of the United States considered this to be a rather
internal problem and not the concern of the international community.
Germany didn?t help matters either by jumping the gun and
recognizing Croatia before it met the standards set by the European
Community. Under the EC plan, Croatia would have to make a
constitutional provision recognizing Serbs living in Croatia as
citizens of Croatia and protecting them with equal status. Germany,
eager to stop the armed conflicts within Croatia, officially
recognized Croatia?s independence and thus, forced the rest of the EC
to do so as well.
The third phase of the disintegration of Yugoslavia is marked
by a decidedly different approach to the Balkans by the international
community. The European Community, lead almost unwillingly by
Germany, offers to recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent in
January of 1992. By March of 1992, Bosnia itself had attained the
standards that the EC set for recognition of independence. Sixty-four
percent of the population voted in a referendum for independence while
most of the Serbs abstained. By this time as well, it had become
apparent that Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic had planned to take over
about two-thirds of Bosnia. The United States and other allies
considered recognizing the sovereignty of Bosnia as a way to avert the
impending military action.
In March of 1992, the United States pushed for the
independence of all four of the breakaway republics (Croatia,
Slovenia, Bosnia, and Macedonia). On April 6 and 7, the United States
recognized Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia (Macedonia was left off the
list due to pressure from Greece.) This recognition of sovereignty
was a few days too late. Several days earlier, the Serbs had begun
their attacks. They were better equipped, better trained, and in
better position. The Bosnian army had been overwhelmed (Zimmerman,
9).
What was the United States? position on the Serb attacks? The
American government announced that it intended to withdraw it?s
ambassador from Belgrade. This was merely symbolic since the embassy
itself was still intact and under the control of a charg? d?affaires.
On May 30, the United Nations, at the request of the United States
imposed an economic embargo against Serbia. This embargo was similar
to that imposed upon Iraq during and after the Gulf War.
President Bush, however, refused to use military force in the
region and to some degree, I agree with his reasoning. There are
three main reasons that kept a military reaction at bay. The first is
that no matter how small the initial action, a continued, expanded
operation was expected. Much like Viet Nam, the Bosnian conflict
offered obstacles to a quick, speedy, and painless process. The
second reason is that there were no clear objectives in the region and
no commitment to leaving. The problems that caused the conflict would
not have gone away by simply rolling a tank down main street of
Sarajevo. Finally, the third reason — politics. Had Bush committed
troops to the war in Bosnia, a wave of potentially unpopular criticism
may have took the sails out of his campaign. How would Bush have
explained to his electorate that he was responsible for sending young
American boys to their death? He couldn?t take the chance.
So, the war in Bosnia continued. The United States and other
allies toyed with the idea of airlifting food and medical supplies to
the regions cut off from direct aid coming in to Sarajevo but the
military, without clear objectives and a plan of attack, failed to
support those missions as well. Bush lost the election in 1992 and
left office. Clinton entered the situation late and because of it,
was left with Bush?s legacy of inaction. The Serbs had taken control
of over seventy percent of Bosnia (Zimmerman, 11) and had consolidated
their control of the region before Clinton could find his way to the
bathroom in the White House.
Eventually, the Clinton Administration did raise a stronger
voice but this was short lived because of the Europeans? unwillingness
to cooperate in a plan to lift the arms embargo and to hit Serb
strongholds with air strikes. After this plan failed to win popular
support in Europe, the United States continued on it?s course of
rhetoric and apathy. Why did the Clinton administration choose to
abandon such an aggressive posture? Again, the answer is political.
As Zimmerman agues in his piece, Bill Clinton could not disagree with
the Pentagon for various reasons. He had no military record and was
seen as a draft dodger to most of the brass at the Department of
Defense who had more than likely served in Viet Nam. Second, he took
on the military establishment by trying to get homosexuals into the
military. Finally, the Clinton administration?s position with all
matters of international conflict for the next two years seemed to be
rather distasteful of using the military to solve the problem.
Clinton?s approach was to negotiate a peace… not enforce it.
The Clinton administration as well as the Congress and
American press clearly identified the Serbs as the aggressors and the
Bosnians as the victims. After all, it was the Bosnian Serbs lead by
Karadzic who claimed sections of Bosnia to be Serb territory and to
withdraw Serb members of the Bosnian government and form a new
government. Additionally, it was the Serbs who began the ethnic
cleansing of the Croats and Muslims of Bosnia. The Serbs were the
ones supplying the Bosnian Serb army and the Yugoslav army which was
beating the Bosnian army into the ground. Still, the use of force was
not a serious option.
The goal of the international community, the EC. and the
United States was to solve the conflicts in the Balkans through
peaceful means yet everything that they did seemed to cause more
conflict. One plan that was do ?cantonize? the various regions in
Bosnia along ethnic lines. However, the EC insisted that whatever
plan was reached had to be put on the ballot for a referendum. The
Serbs argued that the Croats and Muslims would naturally outvote the
Serbs in favor of a unified, independent Bosnia. In February of 1992,
the EC and United States sponsored a summit in Lisbon where the
partitioning of Bosnia was agreed upon even though no lines were
actually drawn.
Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia and a Muslim,
seemed to be for the plan at the summit but once he returned home,
quickly changed his mind. Several factors contributed to this change
of heart. Izetbegovic knew that if the west did not intervene
militarily, Serbs would surely take over the country and the Muslim
population would be decimated. Furthermore, if he agreed to a
partition of Bosnia, at least a Bosnia would still exist. Bosnia
itself would have to be large enough to show up on a map or it would
most certainly be absorbed by either Croatia or by Serbia
(Yugoslavia). However, when Izetbegovic returned home to Sarajevo, he
found that there was little to no support for the plan and that it was
in his best interests to abandon it (Bennett, 236-239).
What good would a division of Bosnia do? It obviously rewards
the Serbs for being the aggressors and punishes the Bosnian Muslims
for wanting an independence that the United States and European
Community had already to recognize. Furthermore, partitioning Bosnia
would have broken up the state into microstates with little to no
cohesion. Pockets of Serbs would be living among pockets of Croats
and pockets of Muslims. What kind of country would that be? There is
no clear majority in Bosnia therefore, the government would be in a
constant state of gridlock with nothing getting accomplished because
each canton could be voting along ethnic lines.
However, Serbs had control of most of the country. While in
control, they sought to consolidate their hold on lands in eastern
Bosnia as well as a section of northwestern Bosnia where large Serb
populations lived. The also selected as their target a narrow
corridor of land that connected the two regions of Bosnia that they
controlled. Once in control, they began campaigns to rid their
targeted regions of other ethnic groups. Murder and assault were some
of the options but the Serbs also relied on rape as a means of ethnic
cleansing (Donia and Fine, 247).