It is not at all surprising to hear the Chekist’s activities frequently
attacked by friends as well as enemies. We have taken a hard job. When we
took over the government of the country, we naturally made many mistakes,
and it is only natural that the mistakes of the Extraordinary Commissions
[the Cheka] strike the eye most. The narrow-minded intellectual fastens on
these mistakes without trying to get to the root of the matter. What does
surprise me in all these outcries about the Cheka’s mistakes is the manifest
inability to put the question on a broad footing. People harp on individual
mistakes the Chekas made, and raise a hue and cry about them. We, however,
say that we learn from our mistakes…When I consider its activities and see
how they are attacked, I say this is all narrow minded and futile
talk….What is important for us is that the Chekas are implementing the
dictatorship of the proletariat, and in this respect their role is
invaluable. There is no other way to liberate the masses except by crushing
the exploiters by violence.
The quote begs quite a few questions; what are the mistakes being talked
about? What has been learnt from these mistakes? And was the Cheka activity
aimed solely at the old ruling class?
Revolutionary Terror
The Bolshevik policy of Red Terror began shortly after the beginning of the
Civil War in the summer of 1918, and was mirrored by the White Terror. The
policy promoted the use of mass execution and fear as a tactic to be
implemented ruthlessly. Acts of violence, rather than being viewed as
regrettable and destructive were glorified. Latsis, the head of the Cheka on
the Eastern front, wrote In civil war there are no courts of law for the
enemy. It is a life or death struggle. If you do not kill, you will be
killed. Therefore kill, that you may not be killed.(10) . The paper of the
Red Army wrote after an assassination attempt against Lenin; Without mercy,
without sparing, we will kill our enemies in scores of hundreds. Let them be
thousands, let them drown themselves in their own blood. For the blood of
Lenin and Uritskii…let there be floods of blood of the bourgeois – more
blood, as much as possible.(11) It’s hard to see what this frenzied call for
destruction and retribution could contribute to the task of building a new
and freer society.
Collective punishments, categorical punishments, torture, hostage taking and
random punishments – aimed at providing lessons – were all applied in the
name of the revolution. Categorical punishments were punishments based not
on what someone actually did, but on what class or political background they
belonged to. On the 3rd of September 1918, Ivestia announced that over 500
hostages had been shot by the Petrograd Cheka, these were people convicted
not because they had committed a crime but because they were unfortunate
enough to come from the wrong background.
There are two interpretations that may be applied to the use of
revolutionary terror; on the one hand, it may be aimed against
counter-revolution, on the other it may be used to compensate for the
regimes declining popularity. As Emma Goldman wrote in 1922, ..an
insignificant minority bent on creating an absolute State is necessarily
driven to oppression and terrorism(12). The policy of revolutionary terror
is in direct opposition to obtaining mass participation in the running of
the society. While these tactics certainly consolidated the Bolshevik’s
power base, they undermined the socialism the revolution had been about in
the first palace.
In the countryside the Bolsheviks became the ‘occupying army’ instead of the
‘liberating army’, alienating the very population they should have been
trying to convince. Terror is a doubled edged sword, it may be expedient but
its use also discredits any regimes claim to fairness.
Furthermore as Malatesta the Italian anarchist wrote in 1919 Even Bonaparte
helped defend the French Revolution against the European reaction, but in
defending it he strangled it. Lenin, Trotsky and comrades are certainly
sincere revolutionaries, and they will not betray what they take as
revolution, but they are preparing the governmental apparatus which will
help those who follow them to profit by the revolution and destroy it. They
will be the first victims of their methods, and with them, I fear, the
revolution will collapse. History repeats itself, mutatis mutandis: and the
dictatorship of Robespierre brought Robespierre to the guillotine and
prepared the way for Napoleon.(13) Perhaps Trotsky should have heeded
Malatesta’s words.
The Death Penalty
One of the first acts of the 2nd Congress of Soviets in October was the
repeal of the death penalty that had been introduced by Kerensky. This was
restored on the 16th June 1918. On 17th January 1920, The Bolshevik
government abolished the death penalty except in districts where there were
military operations taking place. To circumvent this order, the Cheka
routinely transferred prisoners to the military areas for execution. In the
following passage, the Bolshevik Victor Serge, describes how the Chekas
reacted to the abolition of the death penalty
while the newspapers were printing the decree, the Petrograd Chekas were
liquidating their stock! Cartload after cartload of suspects had been driven
outside the city during the night, and then shot, heap upon heap. How many?
In Petrograd between 150 and 200; in Moscow it was said between 200 and
300.(14)
Neither of these actions can be justified by the necessities of civil war as
they occurred well behind friendly lines. Nor were these actions the product
of random events, they weren’t mistakes, rather, as explained above, they
were part of the policy of revolutionary terror
The Anarchists
On the 11th December Cheka and Lettish troops surrounded 26 anarchist
strongholds in Moscow. The anarchists suffered 40 casualties and 500 were
taken prisoner. On the 26th April similar raids were carried out in
Petrograd. At this stage Dzershinsky (head of the Cheka) justified his
action on the grounds that the anarchists had been preparing an insurrection
and that in any event, most of those arrested proved to be criminal riff
raff. He stressed that the Cheka had neither the mandate nor the desire to
wage war on ideological anarchists. Yet documents(15) dating from the 13th
June outlined that the department for counter revolution investigative
section and intelligence unit had sections allocated to dealing with
anarchists. The fact that ‘ideological’ Anarchists were under Cheka
surveillance gives lie to the Bolshevik claim that they were only opposed to
a ‘criminal’ element within the anarchist movement rather than anarchism
itself.
While Leon Trotsky was saying in July 1921 We do not imprison real
anarchists. Those whom we hold in prison are not anarchists, but criminals
and bandits who cover themselves up by claiming to be anarchists(16), 13
anarchists were on hungerstrike in Moscow. Fortunately a French Syndicalist
trade union delegation in the city heard of their plight and the prisoners
were released (all but three were expelled from the USSR). Not so lucky was
Fanyan Baron, a young anarchist woman, shot without trial, along with
several others, on trumped up charges of counterfeiting Soviet bank notes
(it was later proven that the counterfeiting was done by the Cheka itself).
Unlucky also were the 30 or 40 anarchists living near Zhmirink who according
to the soviet press in 1921 had been discovered and liquidated. The last
great mobilisation of anarchists occurred at the funeral of Kroptkin in
February 1921 when 20,000 marched with placards and banners demanding, among
other things, the release of anarchists from prison. From then on the
suppression of anarchists became thorough and complete.
While there was opposition to the Cheka abuses from within the Bolshevik
party, there was no institutional attempt to change its mode of operation.
In any organisation, there is both a human and a structural element. Perhaps
it could be argued that the abuses of Cheka were due to individual mistakes.
If individuals are given unlimited power, including power over life and
death, with no accountability, it’s inevitable that a measure of excess and
corruption will occur. Where this occurs it is up to the revolutionary
organisation to make changes to prevent the same mistakes from being
repeated. This is not what the Bolshevik party did. They continued to
entrust individuals with unchecked power. They did not make any structural
changes to the Cheka. Instead they occasionally rooted out the rotten human
element, closing down certain branches, while leaving the edifice that
engendered these abuses untouched.
Emma Goldman said, on escaping from Russia in 1921, I have never denied that
violence is inevitable, nor do I gainsay it now. Yet it is one thing to
employ violence in combat as a means of defence. It is quite another to make
a principle of terrorism, to institutionalise it, to assign it the most
vital place in the social struggle. Such terrorism begets counter-revolution
and in turn becomes counter-revolutionary.(17)
3. Defending the revolution
The other side to defending the revolution is that of defending it from
outside military attack. Here there are two forms of organisation open to
the revolutionary; employing either a conventional military army or
employing a militia. Again the Russian Revolution provides a concrete
example, though initially a militia structure was adopted, by 1918 the
conventional army structures had returned. The difference between the two is
not, as is so often stated, one of efficiency or organisation (with the army
being characterised as organised, while the militia is characterised as
chaotic). The difference between the two is one of democracy.
Following the Brest-Litovsk treaty, Trotsky as Commissar of Military Affairs
set about reorganising the army. The death penalty for disobedience under
fire was reintroduced, as was saluting officers, special forms of address,
separate living quarters and privileges for officers. Officers were no
longer elected. Trotsky wrote The elective basis is politically pointless
and technically inexpedient and has already been set aside by decree(18).
Why did Bolsheviks feel there was a need to reintroduce military discipline?
Why then was there a need for military discipline in Russia 1917 but not in
the anarchist front lines in Spain in 1936?
The conventional army structure evolved when feudal kings or capitalist
governments required the working class to fight its wars for them. These had
to be authoritarian institutions, because although propaganda and jingoism
can play a part initially in encouraging enlistment, the horrors of war soon
expose the futility of nationalism. A large part of military organisation is
aimed at ensuring that soldiers remain fighting for causes they do not
necessarily believe in. Military discipline attempts to create an
unthinking, unquestioning body of soldiers, as fearful of their own side as
of the other.
But, there is another way of organising armies, that of the Militia. The
only difference between the two is that in Militias, officers and generals
are elected, and soldiers fighting are fighting out of choice rather than
fear. This structure removes the necessity for the creation of a division
between officers and soldiers that is reinforced artificially by measures
such as saluting and differential privileges. These measures are no longer
necessary because there is no need to frighten or order soldiers to fight
when they believe in the cause they are about to risk their lives for. There
are many examples of militias successfully operating; the Boers fought with
a volunteer army against the British. During the Spanish Revolution of 1936,
militias in Anarchist controlled areas fought Franco. In 1936 the CNT
declared:
We cannot defend the existence of nor see the need for, a regular army,
uniformed and conscripted. This army must be replaced by the popular
militias, by the People in Arms, the only guarantee that freedom will be
defended with enthusiasm and that no new conspiracies will be hatched from
the shadows(19).
Over the four years 1918-1921 the anarchist Makhno commanded militias who
fought against the forces of the Hetman, White Generals Denikin and Wrangel,
nationalists like Petliura and Grigor’ev and, of course, the Bolsheviks in
the Ukraine. At its height it had 30,000 volunteer combatants under arms.
Makhno and his commanders won against odds of 30:1 and more, on occasion.
The insurgent army was a democratic military formation. Its recruits were
volunteers drawn from peasants and workers. Its officers were elected and
codes of discipline were worked out democratically. Officers could be, and
were, recalled by their troops if they acted undemocratically.
Those supporting conventional army structures argue that they are necessary
because without them, in the heat of battle, soldiers will turn and rout.
History has shown that people will give their lives in defence of a cause if
it is great enough and if they believe in it.
Of course there are many more examples of operation of conventional military
armies (W.W.I, W.W.II., Vietnam etc. etc.). These were conflicts where it
was not necessary to obtain the consent of soldiers. The role of military
discipline is to prevent conscripts from mutineering when faced with the
horror of wars in which they had no interest in fighting. These were
conflicts where human life was lost in great numbers. The generals directing
the war effort were able to make mistake after mistake, wasting lives, with
no accountability (see any military history of the Battle of the Somme,
Galipoli, etc.). These many examples give lie to the excuse that it is more
efficient and that it is necessary, to organise along authoritarian lines.
The function of hierarchies of rank and decision making is to ensure that
the power of an army is directed and controlled by a minority.
4. Factories in Revolution
After the revolution there were two choices available to those running the
economy, either to organise production in the hands of the state or in the
hands of the workers. In order to achieve the former the Bolsheviks had to
move against the latter. The factory committees were groups of workers
elected at most factories before, during and after the October revolution.
The delegates to these committees were mandatable and recallable. They were
elected initially to prevent the individual bosses from sabotaging
equipment. They quickly expanded their scope to cover the complete
administration of the workplace and displaced the individual managers. As
each workplace relied on many others, to supply raw materials, for energy
and to transport their products, the Factory Committees tried to federate in
November 1917.
They were prevented from doing so by the Bolsheviks through the trade union
bureaucracy. The planned ‘All Russian Congress of Factory Committees’ never
took place. Instead the Bolshevik party decided to set up the ‘All Russian
Council of Workers Control’ with only 25% of the delegates coming from the
factory committees. In this way the creative energy of Russian workers,
co-ordinated outside Bolshevik control, was blocked in favour of an
organisation the party could control. This body was in itself stillborn, it
only met once. It was soon absorbed by the Supreme Economic Council set up
in November 1917 which was attached to the Council of Peoples Commissars,
itself made up of Bolshevik party members.
In November 1917 Golas Truada (the official organ of the Union for Anarchist
Propaganda) warned:
Once their power is consolidated and ‘legalised’, the Bolsheviks who are
Social Democrats, that is, men of centralist and authoritarian action will
begin to rearrange the life of the country and of the people by governmental
and dictatorial methods, imposed by the centre. Their seat in Petrograd will
dictate the will of the party to all Russia, and command the whole nation.
Your Soviets and your other local organisations will become little by
little, simply executive organs of the will of the central government. In
the place of health, constructive work by the labouring masses, in place of
free unification from the bottom, we will see the installation of an