The Battle of Britain?s length and its exact events is often the subject of debate. As with many battles in war, events and dates are often open for interpretation. The battle though can be divided into four separate phases. Phase one consisted of the early probing done by the Luftwaffe of the RAF. The second phase focused on Germany?s attacks on key British defensive systems. The third phase started what was known as the ?Blitz?, or the attacks on London and other civilian sites. The fourth phase saw the Germans switch to night bombings and eventually taper off all aerial attacks on Britain, thus ending the ?Blitz?, which formally ended the Battle of Britain. (Bickers, Richard Townshend. The Battle of Britain. New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1990. 108).
The Luftwaffe began the Battle of Britain by testing the abilities of the Royal Air Force and attacking crucial British convoys. They attacked and tested the RAF to keep them busy and possibly weaken their defenses as they prepared their troops for a grand assault. They attacked the convoys, which carried coal and bulk raw materials, hoping to cripple Britain that had learned to depend on these convoys to sustain its nation?s economy (Bickers 108). The Germans did not plan on all out victory in Phase one, which began on July 10, 1940. The bulk of the damage done to both sides in phase one was over the coastal convoys. Many young RAF pilots were lost due to over zealousness and over-stepping their bounds. They would often chase the German bombers back to France only to be ambushed by a group of BF-109?s (Franks 17-18). Hitler wanted to flaunt his ?superior? air force to show how invincible it was. He still hoped in the back of his mind that England would cut a deal after the German?s conquered the vast majority of Europe. He did not want to risk any potential settlements by bombing civilians or towns. Instead, he decided to destroy the convoys that scattered the waters surrounding Britain in hopes of causing the RAF to be drawn into a dogfight and have Britain waste its precious reserves (Franks 17). Goering, the German Air Force Commander, met with early success. He managed to claim three British bombers and 30,000 tons of merchant shipping (Collier, Basil. The Second World War: A Military History. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1967. 135). The British, needing to protect its surviving planes and its shipping convoys decided to change its tactics:
In consequence of the preliminary offensive the British changed the organization of the timing of their coastal convoys, hastened existing arrangements for the diversion of ocean traffic to west-coast ports, and moved destroyers hitherto at Dover to Portsmouth. Their aircraft factories remained in full production, as did two factories, which supplied all the engines for their Hurricanes and Spitfires. Thus they were able, during the weeks that divided the fall of France from the beginning of heavy air attacks on Britain, to make good the shortage of fighters with which their losses from Norway to Dunkirk had left them, take current losses in their strode, and build up a small force. (Collier 135-136).
With the British changing convoy routes and locations, the Germans were eager to use other methods at sinking ships:
It was certainly not to be assessed in terms of shipping destroyed, as over the period a whole only 24,000 tons of merchant shipping were sunk in the Channel by aircraft. Between 10 July and 7 August thirteen merchant ships, totaling 38,000 tons, were mined and sunk round the coasts of Britain, most of them by mines laid by enemy aircraft. This was almost as much as was sunk by air attack; and it was obtained at a far smaller cost to the German Air Force. (James, T.C.G. The Battle of Britain. Great Britain: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000. 43).
Ultimately, the attacks on the convoys and intercepting fighters were not a great success for either side. It showed that Britain had faults within their system of defense and intelligence. The Germans learned that, even with superior numbers, they would suffer great losses if they decided to fly over the English Channel and stayed to fight: Air supremacy is as much a product of morale as of material strength, and, that being so, Fighter Command had fared well in the July fighting?(James 45). During phase one, the Luftwaffe lost nearly 200 aircraft and all of its downed crew while Britain suffered only half of that and one fourth of its downed pilots. The end of phase one came with a shift in tactics by the Germans: (Walker).
The time of probing was at an end. If Hitler had any intention Britain he had to attack in the summer, and before he did, Fighter Command had to be destroyed. On 19 July Hitler made his ?last appeal to reason? speech to the Reichstag ? but he should have known Britain would in no way contemplate surrender. Hitler was confident of victory, for in his hands was the latest intelligence report comparing the Luftwaffe strength with that of the RAF. In its conclusion it showed that the Luftwaffe was clearly superior to the RAF in strength, equipment, training and command. In the event of intensive air warfare the Luftwaffe would be in a position to achieve a decisive effect in 1940 in order to support an invasion. What the report did not allow for was the dogged, stubborn attitude of the British in general, or the skilled determination of the pilots who stood in the of German victory. (Franks 21).
With the conclusion of phase one, Hitler recognized that air dominance would either make or break his invasion. With that, he decided to swing his mighty axe with full force into Britain?s throat hoping to sever the last remnants of resistance. The time to attack was now.
The second phase of the Battle of Britain focused on the destruction of the Royal Air Force Fighter Command. Heavy focus was placed on neutralizing the RAF through the destruction of its airfields, radar stations, and, ultimately, the annihilation of the aerial forces that separated Hitler from victory (Franks 108). Leonard Mosley wrote, ?On August 13 the Luftwaffe swarmed across the Channel toward England in force. To begin with, their targets were radar stations?( Mosley, Leonard. The Battle of Britain. Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1977. 111). On that day, the German Air Force flew 1,485 sorties en masse to destroy key radar stations positioned in the south of Great Britain. While destroying only thirteen British planes, they lost forty-five planes and pilots that day (Mosley Battle 112). They hoped that by flying and destroying key radar stations and airfields, that the RAF would be forced to leave the ground and use up the last of their reserves to fight and defend its bases and stations (Collier, Richard. Eagle Day. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company. 74). This worked to some extent, forcing some British planes to engage in battles they wouldn?t have otherwise been involved:
Though the RAF pilots were still hitting back, they were hurting even more than the Germans, for they had fewer planes to spare. If something were not done soon, they would bleed to death. Though British aircraft factories were now working at full speed turning out planes, they could not keep up with the losses; nor could men be trained fast enough to replace those pilots who were killed or maimed. After Goering?s angry criticisms, the Luftwaffe redoubled its efforts to destroy the RAF. ?The enemy is to be forced to use his fighters by means of ceaseless attacks. In addition, the aircraft industry and the ground organization of the air force are to be attacked?by night and day,? he had ordered. His pilots responded with determination. Around the clock the Luftwaffe was striking everywhere now where they were most likely to do harm to Britain?s defenses: airfields, aircraft factories, oil and gas depots. They were getting badly hurt, but so was the RAF, which could less afford the pain and the suffering.(Mosley 116)
Goering?s battle to destroy the RAF should have lasted only a couple of weeks, but the German?s underestimation of the RAF and their extreme over-confidence soon became too much for them to handle. They were being stretched beyond their limits. They had been flying 1,500 sorties a day with great losses every time. Goering soon found his pilots to be dispirited as opposed to the burning desire that still filled the RAF. The German ministry soon put out reports of RAF casualties that were highly inflated. Goering soon believed that the RAF was now an air force that no longer posed a threat. Because of this, Goering called off the attacks on British radar stations for he saw it as a waste of planes. On the contrary, the German attacks on radar stations were just starting to have its effect on the RAF. The Luftwaffe had actually shot a hole in Britain?s radar defense and, with one more week of bombing, would have neutralized Britain?s radar system and greatly reduced Britain?s ability to defend itself. Goering then went to Pas de Calais to celebrate with his pilots on their destruction of the RAF. When he arrived, he saw that the RAF was not only still in existence, but was causing major damage to his Luftwaffe. ?Angrily he accused his men of cowardice. ?You have the best aircraft in the world,? he cried. ?What more do you want?? ?A squadron of Spitfires,? replied Adolf Galland, one of Germany?s fighter aces.? (Mosley 115) The arrogance and pompousness of Goering greatly affected the outcome of the aerial war:
Goering had been a poor choice by Hitler to run the air force. It was not that his self-indulgent lifestyle dismayed the pilots who were working hard at a great risk to win supremacy in the air ? or that he had accused his fighter pilots of lack of determination. Goering had little or no strategic or tactical experience or acumen and his technical knowledge modern warfare also left much to be desired ? with the result that his expectations for the Luftwaffe were ludicrously over-optimistic. (Willis, John. Churchill?s Few. New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1985. 132).
Great Britain held one advantage over Germany when it came to skilled aircrews:
While downed German pilots were a total loss to the Luftwaffe, they were now facing a shortage of skilled aircrews: while on the other hand, the loss of RAF pilots was being made up by an over-increasing influx of volunteer aircrews from the Dominion, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and the United States. (Walker).
During phase one and phase two of the Battle of Britain, only one place was safe from German attack: London. Goering and Hitler knew that a bombing on the civilians of the Britain would give more reason for the United States to join the British cause if it saw Britain?s cities laid waste and the faces of its innocent bystanders being wiped out. Hitler ordered Goering to stay away from London. On the night of August 24, 1940, a stream of bombers was making a bomb drop on a fuel dump along the Thameshaven River when they encountered heavy flak. The bombers were running out of fuel, so they dumped their cargo and turned home. Little did they know that their bombs had been dropped over London. This accidental bombing of London gave Churchill the excuse to change his tactics. He ordered a bomber command who had been commissioned to drop leaflets over Germany to load up with bombs and head for Berlin. Goering said that if Berlin were ever bombed, people could call him Meier, which was used in a derogatory sense by the Germans as it referred to Jews. On August 26, Churchill?s bombers unloaded their reprisal bombs on Berlin in the early hours of the morning. The RAF continued to bomb Berlin for a week straight until Hitler finally caved in and ordered a change of tactics. The Luftwaffe was to concentrate on the bombing of London as a prelude to Operation Sealion (Mosley 117-119). With that, the effective strategies employed by the Luftwaffe in the beginning of phase two were abandoned to settle the score: the capital of Great Britain was to be destroyed.
The Battle of Britain?s third phase consisted of concentrated bombings of the civilian population and forcing British fighters to engage in the air. Along with daytime bombings, Germany coupled nighttime bombings on London and other major industrial centers and ports, such as Liverpool to compliment their daily raids (Bickers 108). On September 7 1940, Germany ordered the bomb attack that was expected by everyone except the RAF:
100 plus Nazi bombers and 300 Nazi fighters were on their way over. RAF fighters were sent to intercept as the Nazi squadrons split, as they always did. Different squadrons heading for different targets. Dowding suddenly thought, what if they didn?t split up and came en masse. There would be no fighters to stop them; the path to London would be wide open. ?That?s funny,? said Robert Wright. ?They don?t seem to be splitting up, do they?? (Mosley 130-131).
The daylight bombing of London did a great amount of damage. This damage was coupled with a bombing that night. This brought the amount of civilians killed or seriously injured to about 2,000 total in the two bombings. Twenty-one British squadrons went to intercept the German bombing units but were often too late as the bombers had already unloaded their cargo. The German Air Force lost just forty-one aircraft while Britain lost seventeen pilots and forty-four fighters destroyed or badly-damaged. A young civilian remembered his experience in London at this time when he wrote; ?The first bombs fell on London proper on a night toward the end of August. The next bombs, as I remember fell on the night of September 5 and 6. This attack was heavier and smashed several small dwellings.? (MacVane, John. On the Air in World War II. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1979. 15).
The early bombings of the third phase were concentrated on the East End. After a few days, German bombers moved to the West End and even managed to land two bombs on Buckingham Palace. This eliminated the feeling that only the poor were being punished. This helped to bring a sense of unity among the British people, and if anything, helped the British war cause. By the end of September, more than half of London?s population, mostly women and children, had left the city (MacVane 31). The daylight campaign against London had done a great amount of damage but not the massive effect that the Luftwaffe had anticipated:
The great attack of 7 September was only surprise in that London proper was heavily attacked for the first time. On the 15th the weather improved and London was again heavily attacked by day. Thereafter, the bombing attacks by day in southeast continued to be made but they were comparable neither with those of the 15th, much less than the 7th. It is broadly the case, therefore, that by the middle of the month the German daylight offensive had lost much of its dangerousness (James 293).
Adolf Galland spoke of his commander?s disappointment in their bombings of London and his failure to drain the RAF of its reserves when he said, ?Goering was shattered, I assured him that in spite of the heavy losses we were inflicting on the enemy fighters, no decisive decrease in their numbers or in their fighting efficiency was noticeable? (Mosley Battle 141). In the last few engagements over London, German pilots were told that no more than one-hundred British planes would engage, yet twice that number was reached within half of an hour of German engagement. Germany on September 9, 11, and 14 used about 200 bombers on the first set of bombing with smaller numbers on the latter two to raid London during the day. The Germans planned the heaviest bombing to occur on September 15th. Two elements of bombers headed for London and were soon met by more than 300 British aircrafts that were sent by Dowding. Germany was able to drop a significant amount of bombs on London comparable to September 7th, yet lost 60 bombers doing it. The lack of dominance by the Luftwaffe, the prominence of the RAF, and the lack of any clear victories forced Hitler to conclude on September 17, that air supremacy was lacking. He concluded that the Luftwaffe was not within measurable distance of creating the right conditions for invasion. Because of these overwhelming factors, Hitler postponed invasion indefinitely, dispersed his invasion fleet and halted the assembly of invasion craft (Collier 142-144). With the apparent halting of all plans to invade Britain, Goering would make a decision that would mark the end of the third phase and the start of the fourth phase of the Battle of Britain. With only mixed results and heavy losses to his squadrons, Goering abandons confrontational daylight bombing and cloaks his attacks under the cover of night.
The fourth and final phase of the war began as Hitler called off Operation Sealion (Franks 108). The German Air Force decided to abandon daylight bombings for the costs were too great. This decision changed the coarse of the air war drastically. Goering’s Luftwaffe was to abandon all bombings except at night (Mosley Battle 142). Goering was determined to leave a lasting impression on Britain. The name for the night raids was the blitz. If Goering could not annihilate the RAF, he would try to gain victory through intimidation Britain’s citizens. Herbert Agar wrote, “On October 7 Goering defined the aims of the blitz: ‘Progressive and complete annihilation of London’, paralyzing Britain’s war potential and civil life, and ‘the demoralization of the civil population of London and its provinces’” (Agar, Herbert. The Darkest Year Britain Alone. New York: Doubleday and Company Inc, 1973. 125). Under a cloak of darkness, Germany’s air force lost the ability to visually confirm a target, of necessity they invented a method of allowing the planes to fly a set, previously designed path towards their target. A pilot would fly on a beam from radio-transmission towers in France that emitted a continuous hum as long as the pilot stayed on the beam?s coarse. If the pilot veered slightly off coarse, a series of dots and dashes would be heard. When near the target, a second beam emitted from a separate tower intercepted the original beam and the pilot would hear a difference in sound. This meant that he would now time his run to a given time interval and drop his bombs. This ingenious system was called the Knickebein or crooked leg. This helped to improve the bombers chance of hitting its key targets, because the Knickebein system was accurate up to about a square mile. The British were well aware of its existence and had developed a method of disrupting it by the time the blitz started. Britain would adapt their own radio beacons and superimpose Morse code on the frequency. This caused German pilots to be given false signals and would cause them to overshoot and completely miss their target (Mosley Battle 143). Britain employed spotlights, antiaircraft weapons, and night fighters to defend its cities from nightly raids. The immediate effect of the blitz was a swing in momentum towards Germany and away from Britain. At the beginning, many big cities and London lay open to heavy German bombing. Until Britain started to implement nighttime defenses against Germany, the German raids were steady, deadly, and extremely effective (Mosley Battle 143). Britain had to do something to counteract the new Luftwaffe tactics. Along with the basic defenses they had set up around London, such as antiaircraft guns and spotlights, Churchill would employ a new type of defense. Herbert Agar wrote, “The new war, the war of the night fighters which Churchill named the ‘wizard war’ turned to England’s advantage in a few months because the British wizards were better than the German ones” (Agar 128). By the time the new year had come, Croom Johnson, a London civilian in London commented on the morale in Britain when he said, “The prospect is considerably brighter than anyone would have dared to hope at the beginning of July. Unless we get knocked out in early spring?I don’t see the war ending in 1941″(Agar 128-129). When Goering had first switched to night bombing, the idea that the enormous Luftwaffe could demoralize Britain was very probable, but by the end of the year, Goering could see that, “Within three months it was clear that they could not” (Agar 129). The British night defenses played a large part in the ultimate failure of the blitz, but a significantly larger part must be given to Goering. The demoralization of London was taking its effect on the East End of London. The blitz caused numerous homeless and dead and was creating an overpopulation endemic that was tearing the city apart. Had Goering continued the constant raids on, specifically the poor and homeless that was hurt the worst by the blitz, within months, he could have created a division between those punished and those not. This would have caused a possibly irreparable fissure between Britain’s sense of unity, but because of Goering’s eccentric tactics, he never pounded steadily on one specific group allowing all of Britain to the feel the pain and thus pulling closer together. Near the end of the battle, the German’s noticed that the number of German Casualties was rising even as they had decreased the number of sorties: