sub-units of the Turkish Army that the landings failed to achieve their desired
effects. The majority of the resistance that the British encountered came from
platoon or company held positions which were well sited to counter an attack.
The failing that the British experienced was not indecisiveness, as was the case
with the ANZACS, but their inflexibility. These Regular units were well
practised in the traditional British ordered form of fighting. However, this
resulted in an inability to move away from the given plan in order to adapt to
the situation on the ground. This was certainly the case at Cape Helles. Whilst
three regiments were being massacred on the central axis of the landings the
units on the flanks had taken their objectives. Tragically they were either
unaware or reluctant to do anything about the situation less than two miles
march from their own positions.
Hamilton was also at fault during this time. He had ensconced himself on HMS
Queen Elizabeth during the battle. The ship itself had its own responsibilities
during the landings in terms of providing fire support, and had inadequate
signalling equipment for an amphibious force commander. So from the outset
Hamilton had cut himself off from any direct intervention with the action on the
ground. At most he could steam up and down the coast, but this too was also
constrained by the missions of the warship. Furthermore the two corps
commanders, Hunter-Weston with the British at Cape Helles and Birdwood with the
ANZACS at Gaba Tepe, were also afloat and they too had inadequate signalling
equipment to the shore. Fundamentally those that were in command of the major
areas of responsibility were not in any position to react to the situation on
the ground. It was from this that the momentum of the Allied landings ground to
a halt. Lack of experience and inertia at the lower levels of command and the
Commander-in-Chief’s inability to formulate any sort of informed picture of
events on the ground caused the operation to flounder at this early, vital
stage.
Subsequent operations in the Dardenelles were equally unsuccessful. By the end
of May U-boats had sunk three British ships providing fire support. As a result
HMS Queen Elizabeth was withdrawn with the rest of the Fleet supporting the
operations causing the support for those on land to be weakened further still.
The Sulva Bay landings during August 1915 were much more adequately equipped for
instance they had powered barges capable of landing up to five hundred men. Yet
the fundamental problems were still there: inertia from inexperience on the
ground, and the distanced and non-contactble senior commanders. The latter were
often so inured by their Western Front experiences during the Sulva Bay landings
that they too readily dug in. This later phase of the Dardenelles campaign
showed that the soldiers were far from defeated themselves. The diversionary
attack by the ANZACS during the Sulva Bay landings were extremely costly in
terms of casualties, however, the soldiers demonstrated their fighting spirit in
that fifteen Victoria Crosses were awarded at the Battle of Lone Pine Ridge
alone.
Hamilton’s replacement, Sir Charles Monro, was mocked by Churchill because his
first recommendation on arrival in October 1915 was to withdraw. Churchill
stated “He came, he saw, he capitulated.” However, Monro was a Western Front
commander held in high regard. On inspecting the situation himself Kitchener
agreed to Monro’s plans. Even at this late stage of the Gallipoli campaign one
can see the machinations of politics at work in the decision-making process.
Huge pressure had been levied upon the British hierarchy to conduct this
operation, yet its execution was half-hearted in terms of preparation at the
strategic level and ineptly commanded at the tactical level. Again the British
Official Historian puts this quite succinctly:
Many reasons combined to frustrate an enterprise the success of which in 1915
would have altered the course of the war. But every reason will be found to
spring from one fundamental cause – an utter lack of preparation before the
campaign began.
This lack of preparation can be seen in the intermittent naval actions that did
little material damage to the Turks but succeeded in warning them of further
action. These were carried out with complete disregard to prior tactical
planning that had taken place concerning the very same scenario. Nonetheless the
pressure that was placed upon those in Government, particularly Churchill, for
the operation to succeed caused sound tactical planning such as the need for
surprise to be ignored. Hamilton’s attempts were crippled from the outset due to
the inadequate experience of the bulk of his forces, and the lack of necessary
battle-winning artillery. His method of command was the underlying factor
however in that it was indecisive and far too removed to affect the action on
the ground. At lower levels this caused stagnation and stalemate on the
battlefield.