Yet, the division between the public and private sphere remains obfuscated in Russian society. The dispersion and coerciveness of the Communist Party dulled the line between state and civil society. In order to consolidate and strengthen the nascent private sector, Russia needs to create an administrative system that actively encourages its growth. Recent improvements indicate that the distribution of wealth is becoming more equitable. Recent improvements in the privatization process, in addition to a growing sense of entrepreneurial spirit among less advantaged segments of the population hold great promise for the growth of small-scale property ownership; a significant step in consolidating private ownership (Fish 234). To allow a government to actively encourage private, economic enterprise, political appointments must move beyond the personal level. There should exist a balance between the administrative and political roles of the members of the bureaucracy. Shevstova writes that Yeltsin “had a habit of ranking personal loyalty to himself far above professionalism when choosing appointees and subordinates” (Shevstova 69). To challenge this traditional system, a professional bureaucracy, one that is limited in its ability to intervene directly in the policy-making process, must be established. Another pivotal ingredient to democratization that Shevstova feels was missing from the Yeltsin administration was “a lack of imperatives to build broad consensus and foster genuine communication between leaders and citizens at large” (Shevstova 57). Much of this can be attributed to the Communist tradition that placed vast authority in the local ministers. The autarkic, socialist system allowed executive agencies to attain many legislative favors. Communication with constituents and consensus building was an unnecessary hassle. The true conflict existed within the decision-making elite. Shevstova believes this lack of consensus building and communication are characteristics that have loomed since Leninism (Shevstova 57). Political power was granted only to a self-selected elite that appointed new personnel not so much for their technical skills, rather their willingness to embrace Communist ideology or their relationship to powerful party elites. This system of clientelism impeded and made irrelevant any development of modern, responsive bureaucratic institutional arrangements. As a result, today’s bureaucrats (and yesterday’s communists) find it difficult to appreciate the need for compromise, power sharing, and local initiative. This is precisely the problem Russia faced with Yeltsin. Rising through the nomenklatura , gaining a reputation as a fearless reformer, Yeltsin suddenly found himself as a member of the Politburo. Once again, Yeltsin proved himself an able and determined reformer, but an estrangement between himself and Gorbachev set in when Yeltsin began criticizing the sluggish pace of reform at party meetings, challenging party conservatives and even criticizing Gorbachev himself. Yeltsin was eventually forced to resign in disgrace from the Moscow party leadership in 1987 and from the Politburo in 1988. He was accused of seeking “cheap popularity” and of excessive radicalism with respect to perestroika. Gorbachev had a hand in Yeltsin’s removal. Firstly, he prevented Yeltsin’s removal from the Central Committee, which in turn made it impossible to try Yeltsin, while enabling him to remain in Moscow. Gorbachev also ordered the publication of the speeches at the Moscow meeting reproving Yeltsin in his attempt to achieve “cheap popularity.” In doing so Gorbachev hoped to garner public support for Yeltsin in order to anchor political reform within the Politburo. Despite the short-lived support of the populace and image as a hero, Shevstova contends he remains well-known for his tendency to become a political chameleon, changing his colors to suit any political condition. He has at one time or another been a communist boss, a reformer within the communist system, a liberal slayer of communism and a nationalist warrior against secessionism (Shevstova 69). Lilia Shevstova is fervently critical of the decisions Yeltsin made in the post-Soviet era. She lays much of the responsibility for the politics of confrontation squarely at the feet of Yeltsin and his advisors (Shevstova 58). She first debunks the idea that Yeltsin is a “destroyer of the old system.” Rather, she deems him a reformer who did not attempt to address the institutional hegemony held by the former nomenklatura. As a result of his policies, concentration of political and economic power remained in the hands of the former communist elites. She identifies a number of Soviet era tactics, such as pitting members of nomenklatura against one another; that still personified Yeltsin’s decision-making process well into the post-Communist regime (Shevstova 60). The Presidential Revolution of 1993 marked a shift towards a more personalistic brand of rule for Russia. Shevstova argues that the Constitutional Crisis of 1993 was largely predicated on Yeltsin’s attempt to outmaneuver his old Communist rivals, who had found sanctuary in the legislature (Shevstova 62). The supporters that Yeltsin lined up behind him for this insurgency upon the Supreme Soviet were widely divergent in their political orientations and goals. They included liberal reformers, bureaucrats and pragmatists, statists and security officials, and extreme nationalists (Shevstova 63). According to Shevstova, there seems to have been very little change in how things were done under the Yeltsin regime versus the Gorbachev regime. The specific issues were previously addressed. Another significant point to note is that there was far too much reliance on Yeltsin’s personal prestige and charisma (Shevstova 64). Yeltsin operated outside of the nascent party system because parties constrain leaders. He was not an institution builder but, as his policies demonstrated, he was a populist. His communist background did not make him reluctant to turn to extra-legal means to achieve his goals. Shevstova believes that it was this procedural uncertainty, and dependence upon the “man” and not the “measures”, that created the greatest concern for the establishment of stable democracy.
Fish describes an unconsolidated democracy as a system that would embrace many of the basic elements of democracy, such as elections and considerable civil and cultural freedoms (Fish 226). Yet we are unlikely to witness the establishment of stable rules and institutions that are appropriate to their respective social structures or accepted by their respective citizenries (Smitter 60). Due to the lack of any credible alternatives to democracy, it is doubtful that we’ll see a regression back to authoritarianism. Yet if appropriate reforms are not enacted, we will probably observe what is referred to as democracy by default (Smitter 60). The fundamental rights of democracy will exist, but “regular, acceptable, and predictable democratic patterns never quite crystallize” (Smitter 61). The 1993 Constitution worsened this problem by granting the president enormous power, providing the groundwork for discretionary, personal expressions of authority that contradict the needed objectives of broad based political aggregation.
In sum, with the apparent lack of public participation in government, and in turn the lack of communication by the government with the people we can see that the Russian Federation is far from being democratic. The government acted too quickly in its economic reforms with not enough practical experience with Democratic/Capitalistic institutions to pull it off. It remains evident that some of the major contributing factors to the fall of communism were the dissension of the citizens; primarily due to the fact that the government did not live up to its promise of a better life and the failure of the government to properly deal with social problems. The other factors were economic, many of which we can see are apparent in the new system. In it’s current situation we are seeing the same factors. Unless these problems are addressed quickly and resolved effectively we will witness the demise of yet another Russian governmental system. On looking at the past we can see that the Russian public must overcome many obstacles in order for them to truly embrace Democracy and enjoy the promises of a better life that it has made. The government must actively promote the education of its citizens and communicate more efficiently with them. The Russian Federation faces a long journey before they can fully achieve democratization, and given the enormity of the task, it almost seems unfeasible.
Lecture Notes. Professor Lofchie
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