Part Two: Integration of Care and Justice
The major point of this part of the paper
is to hypothesize and analyze Kohlberg’s stage three and four, along with
the transition between the two. From what I have gathered from the assignment,
the goal is to reanalyze both the stages, show their adequacies and inadequacies,
then integrate the two to form a stronger quasi-stage four. I have discussed
the stage three to four “regression” in the first part of my paper, but
this segment will be more dedicated to the integration of the stage’s details,
rather than the blatant defense of the perspective.
My first job will be to show stage three’s
adequacies. Stage three is a personification of what we all wish we could
be. Noble, strong, and almost saintly, it represents all of the qualities
that everyone wants to possess. The stage is almost entirely based upon
the idea that all people deserve to be treated with respect and dignity,
regardless of the previous actions, or outward complexion. I find that
the word “faith” seems the best to describe this stage. Faith in people
around you, and in their motives.
However, some of the shortfalls of stage
three are very aptly listed in the handout packet. It can be indeterminate,
arbitrary, idealistic, indecisive, and localized. Indeterminacy has it’s
root in the enactment of the “golden rule”. It seems so simple and easy
to discuss, but in practice, it’s execution is questionable. “Do unto others
as you would wish them to do to you.” But why does that indicate that it
is the right choice? Isn’t it a matter of personal preference? Suppose
I enjoy being beaten with a bat! Does that give me the right to do it to
someone else? This rule assumes that all people share the same interests,
likes, and dislikes. If the entire population has an aversion to physical
harm, then this rule will work. However, can’t an assailant justify his
actions by proving that he enjoys physical harm? Although morally enticing,
the golden rule does not set down concrete guidelines that should mold
people’s behavior.
Localization and the in-group also propose
a significant criticism of this view. Stage three almost mandates that
those people who surround you are the most important in the world. One
should fulfill their obligations to the in-group above and beyond all others.
In other words, you must desensitize yourself to the rest of the world’s
problems, and just deal with those that involve your direct family. How
in the world can this be considered a moral competence? You are selecting
those people for whom you will show compassion and caring, and excluding
others by rule. Unfortunately, stage three has no allowance for integrating
the social contract into moral development. Instead, it totally excludes
it with this in-group system.
To close this point, I would like to raise
the hypothesis that stage three is theoretically the best stage that can
be achieved. It assumes that people are moral by nature, and with a little
guidance, can show this in their treatment of others. The assumption is
made that regardless of perspective, there are undeniable rights and respects
that every human deserves. No matter what the priorities of each individual,
they will not infringe upon the rights of others. However, in practice
it is simply not effective. Based upon the competence achieved up until
the stage three level, it seems the best policy of interaction. But in
practice, it stinks!. It just does not function on a level that would allow
it to be the predominant
method for interpersonal relations and ethical
decision-making. The system is based upon trust and values, neither of
which people tend to put much faith into.
Stage four remedies many of the stage three
inadequacies with the introduction and assimilation of a social contract.
Many of the same ideas from stage three remain, given new functionality
and definition. For instance, the golden rule has been replaced with social
reciprocity, the idea that merit is given to good citizens. The social
system itself takes over as the primary guiding focus of the people.
Because of this new agreed upon social
contract, the holes of stage three have been filled. There is no longer
the indecisive, abstract nature of the previous stage, because a contract
has been agreed upon by the masses. Not every little niche of the policy
agrees with every person, but for the most part, it holds the beliefs of
the population. A certain “golden rule” has been put into place, with designated
actions that warrant punishment. If you do this, you will be punished accordingly.
There is no chance for arbitration (although one is able to change the
system itself, or prove their innocence through the proper channels). Rules
have been set down, agreed upon, and now enforced.
At the same time, the localization of stage
three has also been removed. The system that works to enforce this “new
golden rule” has to be agreed upon by all people. It’s flavor may change
slightly from region to region, but generally, they must all follow the
same guidelines. So, just to achieve stage four we must banish the localization
of stage three. Personal priorities then follow the system. Instead of
prioritizing the in-group above all others, a new conglomerate is formed
of everyone’s in-groups into one society. The survival of that society
is supreme, since it is the chosen protector of all these familial microcosms.
Laws, rules and regulations take over for individualistic judgement, helping
to herd everyone into the proper behavior.
With this new system, we obviously lose
some of the aspects of stage three that were most attractive. We no longer
have the family dedicated, honor above-all-else person that we did in the
previous stage. He has been replaced with someone who is now, at best,
a law abiding citizen. The principles of stage three have been incorporated,
though not fully, into the pragmatism of stage four. For instance, a lawless
or unconventional act that would not have been tolerated at stage three
would be ignored at stage four so that the integrity of the social system
would not be compromised. We lose the hardcore justice orientation, and
replace it with a more flexible society-inclusive system.
Increasing the size of anything to encompass
more increases it’s complexity. Complexity means that this system is not
only hard to maintain, but increasingly slow to acquiesce to the changing
needs of the people. It takes a lot of time to change an entire society’s
interpretations. Status-quo stagnation occurs very quickly, and reform
seemingly takes forever.
So, imagine that we could take stage four,
plop in into a blender, add some stage three, and come out with an even
better system. What would we do? This is the next question to be addressed.
Looking at stage three’s and stage four’s adequacies and areas of lacking,
we need to incorporate pieces of both into an entirely new system.
The real goal is to somehow take stage
three’s interpersonal nobility and faith, and give them to a stage four
person. At the same time, we do not want to undermine the societal interactiveness
of stage four! I believe that what we end up with is the theoretical model
of a democracy. For instance, we take stage four’s society agreed upon
contract (assuming that it is somewhat noble, as opposed to something from
the Third Reich). We now assume that an act has been committed that borders
between criminality and unconventionalism. How could we approach this?
Stage three says: “If it isn’t a threat to my immediate person, or those
who surround me, then don’t worry about it.” Stage four would reply: “What
of it’s effect on the social system, is it against the law?” What we really
need to do is combine the two perspectives. If this act is first viewed
to warrant public action (an arrest, trial, or hearing), then that should
be the course of action. It is what takes place next that is very important.
During the proceedings, each and every person must come to terms with it
in their own way. They must decide if it is destructive, constructive,
or indifferent. As a group, they must decide on the best course of action.
This way we have incorporated the individualistic judgement and nobility
of each person and fused it with societal administration. In addition,
we have allowed each person to place part of their own golden rule interpretation
into the system.
By carefully combining the features of
two very different stages, we have come up with a system that is better
suited to meeting the needs of a population. Unfortunately, it was invented
hundreds of years ago, and implemented in the United States Constitution.
Granted, it does not work perfectly, but it seems a suitable compromise
when considering the alternatives. It may be a slow process, and one that
can be abused to fit one’s needs, but it is the only one that incorporates
the individual into the molding of the system.
The final part of this paper will be dedicated
to the combination of two very different arenas of thought, the moral development
paths of justice and care. Some have argued for and against each, some
have argued for and against both. What we will try to do is to build an
entirely new moral system on the strengths of these two. Theoretically,
we should come up with a super-competent solution, one that is better than
the two individually. Rather than try to develop this step by step and
point by point (which would be intolerable after about the second line),
I’d like to just give my interpretation of what the final product would
look like. One note: the most that can be possibly asked of any person
in any system is that they give 100 percent all the time. Therefore, any
theorizing that we do is subject to the fact that people only have the
resources to accomplish certain things.
To combine the best features of two diametrically
different institutions of thought we have to first identify what those
features are. Kohlbergian justice is the pragmatic, society oriented variety
that is admittedly dedicated to preserving social systems. Gilligan’s caring
is predicated on good interaction between people. Although they sound like
they might be trying to achieve the same things, they are going at it in
two separate ways. Kohlberg wants to invent a system by which all people
know what is expected of them. Rules are proposed, agreed upon, set down,
and enforced. Each and every person knows what is appropriate behavior.
Even at stage five, the supposed highest known stage of Kohlberg’s development,
the society rates very high. There may be different ways to approach running
a society, but there is no question that there must be something running
it.
Gilligan seems to agree that people need
rules by which they can relate to one another. However, she seems to delve
deeper into the actual motivations of those rules. While obeying the regulations
of society, you must also show some sort of compassion and caring for other
people. As a trivial example, Kohlberg’s system would say that it was rude
to interrupt someone who is speaking. Gilligan would say that merely not
interrupting is not adequate. Instead, you must show interest in what that
person is trying to say. You must somehow relate with the speaker on some
level. In doing so, you not only draw more from his words, but you show
that you can identify with him.
Another feature of Gilligan’s work that
I feel should be integrated into the justice theme is that of self-care.
When put down in words it seems somewhat egotistical and self-centered.
Kohlberg would be interested in self-care only if it contributed to maintaining
society. But balancing the needs of the many, and the needs of the few
is the hardest part about effectively administering any group of people.
Some individuals will have very menial needs, others will say they require
luxuries. The key is to provide a method by which all people can fulfill
those needs. Self-care will differ significantly between even similar people.
So, rather than trying to meet their needs outright, it is better to just
provide a chance by which they can provide for themselves. Thus achieving
a balance between self-care and still allotted care for others. (I know,
I’m drawing the democracy parallelism again, sorry!)
Kohlberg provides us with the minimal framework
by which regulations maintain the necessities of people. If his guidelines
are followed, it can be said that everyone who lives by them will be at
least partially satisfied. Gilligan, on the other hand, shows us that there
is a much deeper level to which we can all aspire. Putting effort into
everyday interaction, from talking to listening, can greatly enhance every
experience. In doing so, we are not only improving the quality of our own
lives, but also the lives of those we interact with.
Another aspect of caring that I would like
to bring into the “justice world” is included in level three, the highest
level of caring. It states that there are absolutely no black or white
issues. What might be correct for one person, is not necessarily the same
for another. This would fill a huge hole in the Kohlberg moral development
system. Justice is largely criticized because it “forces” everyone into
a social group. It then slaps some rules down, and expects that they are
applicable to everyone. Gilligan states that this is not true, but rather,
everything is a shade of gray. Be careful though! This does not mean that
rules are now not applicable to anyone. Rather, it states that we must
use our judgement when considering transgressions of the law. There may
be special circumstances that need to be addressed.
Finally, Kohlberg’s critics have said that
stage five is too arbitrary. It is not easy to tell exactly how much one
owes to the social contract, or what to do with people who do not necessarily
agree with it. Gilligan would argue that there is a way to resolve this
conflict of interests through dialogue, attention, and compromise. Where
Kohlberg’s system leave opportunity for arbitration, Gilligan’s says that
there is no need. Instead of giving people a hard set of rules to live
by, or demanding their surrender to a contract, we could talk to them individually
and address the situation.
At the same time, justice maintains that
there are undeniable rules that must be obeyed. So, we are combining the
best of both worlds. Using Kohlberg’s justice orientation, we are guaranteeing
the sanctity of all those who have already agreed to the social contract.
Concurrently, we’re taking it upon ourselves to listen to a non-supportive
person, and possibly come to a small compromise to fit their needs.
In conclusion, it seems that there is definitely
a way to combine the Kohlberg justice theme and the Gilligan caring theme
of moral development. Mr. Kohlberg provides a method to police a society
that does not include 100 percent utopian citizens. Ms. Gilligan gives
us the ability to relate to each and every person, as a person. She indicates
ways that we can identify with their perspectives, understand their needs,
and compromise. Although the real world seems infinitely more complex than
either of these models, they bear a frightening resemblance to real societies
and real people. Maybe someday, a perfect model will be constructed, judged
by a perfect path of moral development. Until then, I hope that I have
found a good combination of these two ideas.
One last side note: I think I could spend
weeks typing a paper on this subject. There are thousands of facets of
each system that could fit into the other’s potential flaws. However, I
think I’ve been long-winded enough as it is. I have tried to make my points
as succinct and reasonable as possible, but without sacrificing exactly
what I wanted to say. Thank you for your patience.