the strikers returned to work with their demands unmet.32 Once again, it was evident that
government repression was not defunct.
Congress passed an amendment that reinstated direct election of state governors and Senators in
November of 1980. This somewhat dismantled Geisel1s “April Package” which allowed ARENA
to survive the 1978 elections with majorities in both the upper and lower houses.
Still, not everyone was in favor of liberalization. Some of the opponents of the abertura mounted a
campaign of violence against those in support of it. Bombings were prevalent among newsstand
vendors who sold leftist publications. One of the even larger bombings occurred at a leftist benefit
concert, however, the bomb exploded early and killed the two political police delivering it. The
military, who had ties to the bombings, tried to cover up the incident.
Just before the elections of 1982 were scheduled to take place, the government created the
“November Package” and pass it through Congress. This prohibited electoral coalitions and also
required voters to vote a straight ticket in hopes that the PDS would benefit. Even closer to election
time, the government issued another rule; the names of the candidates had to be written in instead of
being checked off. This would benefit the PDS in that they were the only party with “sufficient local
organization to ensure that its voters would learn to fill out their ballots correctly.”33
The results of the elections were that although opposition won 59 percent of the popular vote, it did
not gain a majority in Congress or the electoral college, which would choose Figueiredo1s
successor. However, the PDS lost absolute majority in the lower house of Congress. That meant
that “if the opposition voted together it could block any government legislation.”34
With the opposition in control of key states, the governors of these states found themselves in need
of financial support. The Figueiredo government did not have the funds to give though, because a
great deal of money was tied up in reducing the foreign debt. With the state and local government
working against each other, the local government and governors were in trouble. Soon, the
governors’ approval began to decline because of the unmet needs of their people.
Even though attempts at restructuring the constitution were taken, they proved to be futile. The
Brazilian government was always more focused on retaining their party1s power in the legislature
than on the actual legitimate governing of the state. In regard to this, Linz states:
The fear of discontinuity in policies and distrust of a
potential successor encourages a sense of urgency, …that
might lead to ill-designed policies, rapid implementation,
impatience with the opposition, and expenditures that
otherwise would be distributed over a longer period of time
or policies that might contribute to political tension and
sometimes inefficiency. 35
It seemed that neither Figueiredo nor the PDS leadership had any long-term plans for Brazil; their
main objective was to win the 1985 presidential election. The people wanted democratic reform
and the rate of abertura was just too slow for them. Rallies cried out for direct nationwide election
of the president. The congressional vote fell short, but there were 55 PDS deputies in favor of the
nationwide direct presidential elections. This showed an alarmingly weak government and the
problems of establishing a presidential democracy. Linz also points out that:
Presidential systems can have strong parties, but the
parties are likely to be ideological rather than government
oriented. More often than not, presidentialism is associated
with weak, fractioned, and clientelistic or personalistic
parties. We have only to think of the parties in Brazil…
Presidentialism might lead to the emergence of leaders, but
it is unlikely to lead to party leaders able to govern with
sufficient support in the congress… 36
In conclusion, the Brazilian presidential democracy was not a legitimate one. Most of the
general-presidents used the “winner take all” approach and ruled in a dictatorial manner. The
president committed authoritarian acts that were widely protested among the people. Furthermore,
these government did not represent a true continual dual legitimacy between the executive and
legislature. Perhaps most importantly was the fact that the people did not actually choose the
president. Since the government’s main concern seemed to be retaining their party1s power, they
kept the people from making a real difference in choosing the president. These circumstances
collectively confirm the fact that the Brazilian government was far from a true democratic
presidential regime.