table. In their book “Getting to Yes”, Roger Fisher and William Ury make a number of observations that are highly relevant to diplomats. Chief among these is the concept that without communication there is no negotiation. (39) While the British certainly thought that they were negotiating in good faith, the Argentineans were becoming frustrated because of the mixed messages they were receiving. Had the British diplomats simply ensured that the actions of their government matched what they were saying around the negotiating table, Galtieri s misconceptions would have been cleared up and the entire war could have been averted. It is important to note that, in this case, the Falklands problem would not have been solved, but Argentina would have understood the consequences of invading the islands.
Could the Falklands War been Ended Earlier than It Was?
To Margaret Thatcher, the Argentinean invasion of the Falklands was absolutely beyond forgiveness. She resolved immediately that there would be no negotiation with the Argentineans over anything short of an unconditional surrender. Thatcher s stubbornness is the core reason why Alexander Haig s peace shuttle was such a miserable failure. Even a plea from her personal friend Ronald Reagan did not dissuade Thatcher from her resolve to bring the Argentineans to their knees.(40) The influence of Margaret Thatcher alone ensured that the war would continue until the Argentina surrendered. After reviewing the observations made by Ms. Thatcher regarding the situation, one is left with the impression that she would have fought the Argentineans with her own bare hands if it were necessary to avert defeat.
Conclusion
Argentina only enjoyed possession of the Falkland Islands for ten weeks before the Union Jack once again flew over Stanley. The effect of the loss upon Argentine morale was devastating. While the number of casualties had not been particularly high, (Argentina only lost about 700 soldiers in the war)(41) Argentinean armed forces had been humiliated at every turn. Within a month of the campaign s end, every member of the junta, including Galtieri himself, had resigned. Argentina once again found itself facing more years of uncertainty.(42)
There are dozens of lessons that can be learned from this little war of Argentine imperialism. Military strategists are still developing new ways to combat the ever-potent Exocet missile and most defence ministers are now re-examining the value of conventional carriers.(43) The most important lesson was taught on the diplomatic front, however. The conflict in the Falklands should be an eternal reminder to every negotiator of what can happen when one party misreads the message sent by another. The Falkland War was caused by frustration and misconceptions. The misconceptions were caused by the lack of a clear message from Britain. It is for this reason that history will ultimately judge the war in the Falklands to have been singularly unnecessary.
Endnotes
1. Paul Eddy, Magnus Linklater, and Peter Gillman, The Falklands War (London:
Andr Deutsch Limited, 1982), 33.
2. Max Hastings and Simon Jennings, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1983), 1.
3. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 39.
4. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 39.
5. Hastings and Jenkins, 6.
6. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 41.
7. Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falklands War, (London: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1988), 23.
8. Wayne S. Smith, ed., Toward Resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas Dispute, (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991), 15.
9. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 58.
10. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 62.
11. Freedman, 31.
12. Hastings and Jenkins, 73.
13. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 93.
14. Hastings and Jenkins, 78.
15. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 113.
16. Virginia Gamba, The Falklands/Malvinas War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 150-151.
17. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 154.
18. Patrick Bishop and John Witherow, The Winter War (London: Quartet Books, 1982), 17.
19. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 155.
20. Bruce Watson and Peter Dunn, eds., Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 16.
21. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 163.
22. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 168.
23. David Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War (London: Leo Cooper, 1987), 302.
24. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 220.
25. Bishop and Witherow, 18.
26. Gamba, 77.
27. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 60.
28. Hastings and Jenkins, 46.
29. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 149.
30. John Dollard, et al., Frustration and Aggression (New Haven, CT: Yale UP),
1.
31. Dollard, 1.
32. Ralph White, Nobody Wanted War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970), 10.
33. White, 10.
34. White, 12.
35. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 80.
36. White, 16.
37. The theory states that aggression is always a consequence of frustration.
(Dollard, 1).
38. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 55.
39. Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), 33.
40. Eddy, Linklater & Gillman, 243.
41. Hastings and Jenkins, 316.
42. Hastings and Jenkins, 325.
43. Watson and Dunn, eds., 19.