В то же время коррупция должна стать предметом не только экономического, ноисоциологического, психологического, политологического анализа. Исторические факты, которые разбросаны в литературе о коррупции, говорят о том, что коррупция стара если не как мир, то как власть. В [8] упоминается известная цитата из Л. Актона: "всякая власть коррумпирована, а абсолютная власть коррумпирована абсолютно", и отмечается, что демократия как таковая не кажется достаточной гарантией против взяточничества. Действительно, никто не избежал "участи коррупции" - в литературе приводятся многочисленные факты о коррупционной деятельности в развивающихся странах (Латинская Америка, страны Юго-Западной Азии, Индия и др.), а также в таких развитых странах, как Италия, Испания, ФРГ, Франция. Существуют многочисленные источники о коррупции и периодической борьбе с ней в Китайской Народной Республике (см. [8]).
Сведения о коррупции в дореволюционной России можно найти во всемирно известной классической литературе (см, Гоголь, Сухово-Кобылин, Салтыков-Щедрин, Чехов) в [1], [18], о коррупции в СССР - в книге А. Кирпичникова [18].
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